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Abstract:  Regulation is presumed to be designed to avoid (potential) market failures, 
usually because of firms' market power, the consequence of which leads to a decrease in 
economic welfare. However, the cost of regulation may outweigh any effects policy 
makers have on the firm due to administrative costs, regulatory capture and other effects 
that have been addressed by others. More importantly, policy makers have been using the 
wrong models to guide their decisions, with a major impact on the investment incentives of 
firms, a misallocation of resources and a lowering of social welfare. As policy makers 
misread economic theory, they produce results worse than those they are attempting to 
correct. Thus, these distorting effects are equally as bad, or worse than, the market failure 
regulators hoped to ameliorate. However, this need not be the case. By concentration on 
dynamic models, rather than the simple static models on which policy makers have 
focused, it is possible to improve economics welfare and obtain results that at least are 
better than the costs associated with current regulatory practices. Ofcom appears to be 
moving in this direction. Will other policy makers learn from Ofcom? This paper shows 
some of the failures of the current model and sets forth some of the necessary steps to 
make improvements. However, it is unclear whether the institutional structures will allow 
for such a departure from the current paradigm. 
Key words: competition, economic dynamics, neoclassical economics, pricing policy, 
regulation. 
 
he rationale for government intervention in markets has been a 
market failure – usually due to monopoly/oligopoly power. Without 
government intervention, so the argument goes, prices will be too 
high, restricting demand and creating excess profits – all of which creates 
inefficiencies and leads to high social costs and loss of welfare. In the 
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telecommunication industry network externalities are also suggested as a 
rationale for intervention. Turning the issue on its head, this paper questions 
whether the appropriate regulatory models, and hence the suitable polices 
have been applied. This paper asks if the cost of regulation is not worse than 
the problems it is allegedly correcting? Is government failure greater than 
any possible market failure in the current environment? The paper ends with 
a discussion of dynamic models that correct many of the problems with the 
static models identified. This paper only highlights some of these issues, but 
in light of the New European Regulatory Directives and the legislation under 
consideration by the United States Congress, we are of the opinion that this 
side of the equation should be addressed 1. 
This paper focuses on whether the tools been applied correctly and finds 
that they have not. Secondly, it suggests changing the policy paradigm to a 
model that considers the dynamic nature of markets and the firms' incentives 
and behavior in this context. Although dynamic models are more difficult to 
specify and analyse, and generally offer no simple solutions, this shift in 
focus, if it were to be maintained, would correct many of the distortions 
created by the current paradigm and make regulation meaningful. 
Although the United States is used in our examples, it is not unique in 
this respect. Policy communities throughout the world have used a simplistic 
approach to policy formulation, and in particular to competitive and pricing 
issues, while ignoring investment issues. Policy makers have incorrectly 
assumed that the outcome of "competition" will promote optimal and 
desirable investment. We take issue with this conjecture: "competition" is not 
the competition of the economist; the inference does not address the 
appropriateness of the investments. Indeed, this paper shows that current 
regulatory policy promoting "competition" has been deleterious to sound 
investment policy. 
Firstly, we address the range of problems introduced by the mis-
application of the perfectly competitive model: the introduction of competition 
without regard to its efficiency and the distortion in pricing created by relying 
on the perfectly competitive model. The second section addresses how the 
inappropriate foundation of public policy distorts "competition," pricing 
guidelines and leads to inappropriate investments decisions. The third 
section briefly discusses how dynamic models address and alleviate many of 
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these issues. The fourth section discusses what lessons we can learn from 
this analysis and the final section offers some conclusions and suggestions 
for future research.  
   Incorrect foundations 
With respect to competitive policy, many regulators have made the leap 
from the results derived from perfect competitive markets and determined 
that a duopoly – a market structure with only two players in the market – is 
"competitive." This line of reasoning explains why when British Telecom was 
privatized in the United Kingdom during the mid-1980s, the regulatory 
authority allowed only one additional carrier into the market. It also explains 
why cellular mobile licenses were granted to the incumbent carriers and one 
other provider in the United States 2. 
We do not disagree with the construct of the competitive model, but 
rather question its applicability in a world in which the assumptions 
underlying perfect competition are far removed from market reality. 
Furthermore, the competitive model is, at best, a comparative static model 
that does not entirely correspond to market place realities. Perfect 
information is not available, capital markets are not efficient, input prices are 
not set competitively, etc. Our focus in this essay is on the applicability of the 
textbook model of competition and how misapplying this model distorts 
policy choices. A corollary to these issues is whether the policy targets are 
the appropriate ones. Should the focus be on investment policy and not on 
the promotion of competition for its own sake? Our answer is affirmative. 
Competition 
The conventional economic model of perfect competition produces many 
desirable results. Only the most efficient producers survive, and are 
producing at the lowest minimum unit cost. Consumers cannot be made 
better off without making others worse off. Prices are optimal. Utopia has 
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been achieved with perfect competition. Is it any wonder that the policy 
makers point to competition as a panacea with which to solve all economic 
ills? Consider the late-1970s and early-1980s where the telecommunications 
industry was undergoing unprecedented change. Competition was expanded 
to ever widening areas due to court and Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) decisions – private lines (1959), private microwave 
systems (1969), customer premise equipment (CPE) (1968), domestic 
satellites (1972) and public switched networks (1976 and 1978) 3. 
In the early 1970s in the United States some policy makers argued for 
competition as the preferred policy when reviewing the domestic satellite 
policy. The competitive focus led to the opening of the customer premise 
equipment (CPE) market and the entrance of MCI into the long distance 
market. These events seemed to underscore the benefits of competition. 
The history of this move to competition is well documented (KAHN, 1988) 
and we do not intend to repeat it here, except to point out that the notion of 
competition began to permeate the thinking of policy makers (after they 
fought its adoption in the preceding years). Indeed, the results were 
encouraging. Innovations in customer premise equipment occurred and 
prices fell (including long distance charges). Other players entered the 
market. Technology innovation proceeded apace, with cellular mobile 
service implemented after many years of regulatory debate, and the nascent 
internet was being developed  4. Market structures were also undergoing 
changes. New interexchange carriers were gaining market share. Clearly, 
the traditional monopoly structure dominated by the Bell System and 
independent telephone companies was changing dramatically. Thus, the 
late-1970s and early-1980s marked a watershed for the telecommunications 
industry. This period culminated in the 1984 divestiture of AT&T into a long-
distance company and seven regional operators 5. This radical change was 
to settle the government's antitrust lawsuit against AT&T (ALLEMAN & 
COLE, 2003). 
Concurrently, in the United Kingdom the move towards privatization 
began with British Telecom (BT), which was privatized around the same time 
as the AT&T divestiture. The UK Government also had a competitive model 
in mind when BT was privatized. The government allowed Mercury (a 
                       
3 See ALLEMAN & COLE (2003) for a brief history of these events. 
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subsidiary of Cable and Wireless, the traditional international carrier in the 
UK) to enter the market, but no other players. Soon a series of privatizations 
around the world were proposed and in many cases, took place with the 
encouragement of the U.S. and the UK Governments. The "competitive" 
model was the model in vogue! 6 
Faux success 
In the case of CPE, the conditions were close enough to the conventional 
model to allow competitive entry. The telephone was similar to many other 
electronic appliances made by other manufacturers. Economies of scale and 
scope were not significant, if they existed at all as many firms entered the 
market. Moreover, this market had high profit margins since this segment of 
the market was probably where incumbent telephone companies had 
previously "hidden" monopoly rents from their other businesses that were 
under regulatory control. A variety of new and innovative CPE equipment 
was introduced and prices fell. A true success story for competition! 
However, the same cannot be said of the long distance segment. Here 
the conditions, which prompted the entry of MCI and others, were due to an 
arcane mechanism used to determine telephone industry "costs". The 
system was based on the Smith vs. Illinois Supreme Court decision in 1930 
where the Court ruled that some local exchange equipment (or plant) had to 
be allocated to intrastate and interstate long-distance service by 
jurisdictional separation. This jurisdictional separation of cost began as a 
small percentage of local costs, but grew as different plans were 
implemented and through the growth in long-distance minutes, on which the 
allocations were based (ALLEMAN & COLE, 2003). Thus the industry had 
allocated its costs between "local" and long distance businesses by an 
arbitrary cost allocation mechanism, which for political reasons steadily 
increased the allocation to long distance over time. It was under this 
costing/pricing umbrella that MCI and other long distance carriers were able 
to shelter themselves from the rigors of the market place. That is, the prices 
they were "competing" against were artificial and did not represent the true 
cost of the service, but a composite of the local access and long distance 
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costs. Thus, while prices fell in this segment, this was not due to more 
efficient providers 7. 
The other "success" story was the Competitive Access Providers (CAPs) 
who were also able to take advantage of the price disparity caused by the 
cost allocations mechanisms. Initially, these carriers provided services to 
business customers in large metropolitan areas. Among the reasons for their 
comparative advantage was the over-pricing of the business services to 
support cost allocations. The CAPs could not only offer lower cost services 
because they did not provide a subsidy between the residential and 
business customer as incumbents did, they could also offer a direct 
connection to long distance carriers, avoiding the "local" costs allocated to 
this service by incumbents. Moreover, the CAPs operated in the large urban 
areas which traditionally had higher prices (not costs) than rural areas. Thus, 
the three services – long distance, business and urban areas – subsidized 
residential access and rural areas, which then allowed firms to enter the 
markets providing the subsidy. Business access costs dropped and so did 
long-distance prices for these business customers. The two major CAPs, 
Teleport and MFS, proved such a success that they were sold to AT&T and 
MCI, respectively for billions of dollars. Thus, from an uninitiated 
perspective, these cases "proved" the success of competition. After fighting 
the introduction of competition, and losing several court battles in the 
process, the FCC and the legislature embraced the concept. The result 
became reflected in the Telecommunication Act of 1996. 
The apparent success of MCI, and the huge gains in the sale of Teleport 
and MFS were an example others wished to emulate. In addition, the public 
was becoming aware of the internet with all its promise. Thus, the stage was 
set for a spectacular expansion of the information, communications and 
technology (ITC) sector and the related stock market bubble, which 
collapsed in the spring of 2001. 
Others have covered the rise and fall of the sector (CRANDALL, 2005; 
NOAM, 2003) and the (ir)rationale of the stock market crash (SCHILLER, 
2000). What we wish to point out is that, it was largely the failure of 
government policy due to a lack of understanding of the underlying 
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economics that led to this market failure  8. Two firms do not create 
competition in the economist's sense, nor is competition sustainable when 
false price signals are sent to the market because of artificial cost 
allocations. What policy makers failed to note were the special requirements 
of perfect competition and the particular circumstances of the industries to 
which they were applying it. 
Optimal pricing  
Let us now examine how these inappropriate models have impacted 
pricing or ratemaking issues. Since the 1996 Telecommunication Act, the 
FCC has formalized its pricing policy by relying on notions derived from 
competition theory. As noted, perfect competition implies that when there are 
many firms – virtually an infinite number – in the industry, no single firm can 
affect prices in the market. From the firm's point, according to the theory, 
demand is perfectly elastic and the firm produces where price equals 
marginal cost. It is then shown that this is the most efficient allocation of 
resources. Ergo, first-best pricing is price equals marginal cost. However, 
infinity is a great deal more than two or three or four firms in the industry 9. 
With respect to pricing rules, simplistic results have been utilized, as 
noted. The prime example is the rule "price equals marginal cost" derived 
from the efficient price rule of conventional economics in a static context. It 
has been used to justify "long-run incremental cost" methodology to 
determine prices. In the United States this has been contextualized as Total 
Service Long Run Incremental Cost (TSLRIC) 10. The fundamental idea is 
that under the neoclassical economics assumption of perfect competition 
this is the best, most efficient pricing method. 
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However, this perfect world does not exist as we have already noted and, 
as many commentators have pointed out, externalities – call and network – 
distort the simple model; economies of scale and scope eliminate the 
possibility of an infinite number of providers; indeed in capital intensive 
network industries such as telecommunications, only a few providers can 
survive 11. Nevertheless, policy makers have assumed that this perfect world 
exists; and have attempted to require incumbents to interconnect with 
entrants at prices that approximate static marginal costs. They have 
attempted this by producing a variety of engineering cost models to mimic 
the "marginal cost" methodology. These models have serious flaws because 
they lack a fundamental understanding of economics and finance. We do not 
wish to critique these models – this has been done adequately elsewhere – 
except to note that none of them has a dynamic component that accounts for 
uncertainty of costs and revenues (See ALLEMAN, 1999). 
Nevertheless, regulatory communities have accepted the traditional first-
best pricing results, and the models on which they are based, to apply to 
charges for intermediate services such as interconnection or access to the 
network 12. We disagree with this approach on numerous grounds, but this 
paper's primary concern is with the lack of dynamic efficiency of these naive 
pricing instruments (and cost models), which we discuss below. 
   Lack of dynamic efficiency 
Virtually all policy makers have ignored dynamic considerations in their 
deliberations. While current policy practices do not account for dynamic 
efficiency, we feel it is more significant than static efficiency. Static efficiency 
is concerned with the allocation of resources at a moment in time when, inter 
alia, the productions technologies are the same, knowledge is the same and 
the products/services are identical, etc. 
A moment's reflection will determine this is an extremely narrow view of 
the economy, particularly in the ICT sector which has seen dramatic 
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changes. Alternative, but not exactly similar services are in use: fixed-line 
voice, cellular mobile service, and voice over internet protocol (VoIP) are 
certainly not identical as assumed of the neoclassical models. Or on the 
video side: cable services, direct satellite services, and streaming video over 
a broadband connection are similar but have their own unique 
characteristics. Likewise, this sector has witnessed a series of product 
innovations and technological progress such as digital service over cable 
and digital subscriber line (DSL) service over the traditional telephone lines. 
Or consider the internet or many of its derivative innovations and services 
such as streaming audio and video, VoIP, etc. None of these fit the static 
model of competition. 
However, dynamic models assume all of these conditions to varying 
degrees: resources are not stagnant; innovations will occur, technical 
progress will continue, substitute services will arise, and consumers' desires 
and needs will change. In these situations the policy maker does not have a 
"formula" to apply in developing policy. They are forced to make a much 
more reasoned approach to what will happen in the market – with 
technology, innovation, and market power. Consumers' desires may go well 
beyond simply the price of a service – but include its attributes, performance, 
qualities, etc. And, since the ultimate goal of public policy may not be lower 
(short-term) prices, policy makers must be concerned with a larger view of 
the benefits derived from various market structures. Innovation, economic 
growth, and the magnitude and quality of investment over the long run 
should be their concern (ELLIG, 2001) 13. 
In this short essay, we address one aspect of these dynamic issues – 
investment and, in particular, sunk investments  14. While it goes without 
saying, ICT Investment decisions are crucial to the future infrastructure of an 
economy, and regulatory policy has significant impact on these decisions. 
But much of the economic literature ignores this consideration of the 
dynamic impact 15 and how it affects the timing, magnitude and pattern of 
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Schumpeter's work; unfortunately, they seem to be rarely utilized. The Schumpeterian model is 
one of those models most often cited, but the policy makers do not seem to relay on this or 
other dynamic models in their deliberations. 
14 ELLIG (2001) develops taxonomy of dynamic economic analysis and his book of readings 
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investments and how these concerns interact with financial markets  16. 
Indeed, the prospective of regulatory behavior by financial markets can have 
a significant impact on the equity and bonds markets that, in turn, 
determines the cost and level of funding of the enterprise. Among the goals 
that the regulators should consider are how their decisions will impact 
innovation, the cost of capital, the magnitude of investment, as well as its 
timing because all of these will ultimately impact costs and prices in the long 
run. However, the nature of investment in this sector have unique 
characteristics: they are significant and to a large extent sunk or irreversible. 
If a policy maker is concerned with social welfare, then this requires 
knowledge of economic cost and benefits, but not simply in the static sense. 
This paper argues that not recognizing the dynamic benefits and costs leads 
to a distortion of social welfare. More specifically, significant costs will be 
unrecognized if the dynamics of the firm are not considered. The interaction 
of regulation with valuation influences welfare in several dimensions. Firstly, 
unrecognized costs on the part of the regulatory community mean that the 
prices set by it will not be correct. Secondly, if the financial community 
recognises that the regulator is not accounting for all the enterprise's costs, 
then it will be more expensive for the firm to raise debt and equity capital, 
which, in turn, will increase cost in a vicious cycle, raising costs for 
consumers. 
Unrecognized opportunity costs 
For example, one of the major costs that has not been adequately 
identified or quantified is the obligation to serve. Under the current practice 
in most countries, whenever a customer demands service, incumbent 
carriers are obligated to provide the service as part of the common carrier 
obligation. With respect to investments in new services such as broadband, 
this unrecognized cost may be even more critical. The United States 
Congress has had legislation before it that would require telephone 
companies to provide mandatory broadband service. This would not allow 
firms to assess the market, determine the best time to enter and where best 
to enter. Firms would be on a specific time and geographic schedule and 
would lose the option to delay. Moreover, if the customer proves 
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unprofitable, the carrier still must retain this customer. Thus, carriers also 
lose their right or option to abandon the service (ALLEMAN & RAPPOPORT, 
2002). But these options are opportunity costs, which must be recognized in 
proper cost determination (ALLEMAN & RAPPOPORT, forthcoming). Under 
the regulatory franchise, incumbent carriers are precluded from exercising 
the option to delay or shutdown and restart operations. 
The options have not been considered in the various cost models that 
have been utilized by the regulatory community for a variety of policy 
purposes. The lack of consideration of these options imposes a cost to 
companies and society. As mentioned, the loss of these options can be 
thought of as an opportunity cost to firms. In a previous paper the authors 
(2002) used the deployment of DSL to illustrate the delay option and the 
learning option. We indicated how both may be quantified and suggested the 
parameters that are relevant for these options (See ALLEMAN & 
RAPPOPORT, forthcoming) for an elaboration of these issues. Many of 
these options arise because of irreversible investments or sunk costs. 
Indeed, the most valuable options may be those associated with sunk costs, 
since, once exercised, the investments are irreversible. Moreover, if the 
investment proves unprofitable, the firm cannot recover even some of its 
investment costs. These costs are not only applicable to the incumbents, but 
to potential entrants. Thus, when policymakers consider what would be 
required for new firms to enter a market, they must consider the entrant's 
option or opportunity costs. 
Irreversible investments also play a critical role in the determination of 
market structure (PINDYCK, 2005b). Indeed, this is implicitly recognized to 
varying degrees by regulatory commissions by the requirement to 
interconnect entrants to incumbents' networks. What policy makers have 
failed to recognize is the irreversibility of these costs and their implications. 
One of the greatest sources of potential in terms of the application of 
dynamic analysis is dealing with irreversible investments, since such an 
investment means that a wrong decision cannot be changed, in contrast to 
an investment which, if the investment proves to be unprofitable, can be 
sold 17. But who will buy fiber in the ground, if it has proved unprofitable? It 
cannot be easily moved or put to another use. Thus, intuitively, the "hurtle-
rate" will have to be higher than an investment which is fungible. 
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Alternatively, if the firm "waits-and-watches'; the market to see if a profitable 
environment is forthcoming, it can make the correct decision before 
committing the investment with a positive probability of failure. 
Sunk costs 
What are sunk costs and how do they impact pricing issues, entry 
conditions and market structure? Sunk costs are generally industry and firm 
specific, which implies that they are not fungible 18. In particular, when the 
economy is in a down cycle, the firm's plant and equipment cannot be sold 
to others in the industry, because they have no value (ALLEMAN & 
RAPPOPORT, forthcoming; PINDYCK, 2005b). When considered 
dynamically, it is clear the incumbent firm has already exercised its option to 
delay; whereas in the static context, this fact would not be considered, but 
only the direct cost of the investment. Thus, one can think of this as an 
opportunity cost. Yet it is worth noting that even in this simple example, the 
difference is profound. None of the cost models or the incremental cost-
pricing models even considered this opportunity cost. Moreover, this is just 
one of the many considerations policy makers, business people and financial 
analysts would bear in mind when making the investment. Potential 
competitors also have to value not only the direct cost of investing, but also 
its delay option. The consideration of sunk costs, as opposed to fungible 
investment alternatives, raises entry barriers. Neglect of these dynamic 
issues can cause serious and distorted policy making 19. 
However,this is not the only concern in a dynamic world. Demand, 
technology, factor prices, and many other parameters are subject to 
uncertainty. One of the principal uncertainties for new services is demand, 
which, in turn, impacts cash flow, investment valuations, profits, and 
economic depreciation among other economic variables. Regulation can 
also present the market and the firm with uncertainty, since regulation can 
                       
18 Sunk costs should be distinguished from fixed costs. Sunk costs are costs that cannot be 
recovered once they are incurred, whereas fixed costs end once the firm ceases production. An 
important distinction between fixed and sunk cost is that the sunk cost that has to be incurred at 
the initiation of the project, before the profitability of the project is known. See PINDYCK 
(2005a) and ALLEMAN & RAPPOPORT (forthcoming) and the reference cited therein. 
19 This is distinct from the HAUSMAN's analysis (1998 and 1999) of the "free option" which is 
available to the CLEC under the unbundled network elements (UNE) policy. In the case we 
discuss, the opportunity cost is incurred because the incumbent has exercised its options, and, 
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restrict the flexibility of the firm through the imposition of price constraints 
and by imposing costs associated with either delay, abandonment, or 
foreclosing other options available to the firm. If these regulatory impacts are 
left unaccounted, there are significant costs to the firm and to society. 
(ALLEMAN & RAPPOPORT, 2002, forthcoming) 
Fortunately, this is not true everywhere. Ofcom (2005), the regulatory 
authority in the United Kingdom, has explicitly recognized that dynamic 
issues are important. It has requested comment on one of the techniques for 
examining pricing issues using some of the dynamic tools that are available. 
We applaud Ofcom's approach of examining the real options method to 
determine the correct pricing of wholesale rates for alternative carriers. Let 
us anticipate that other regulators will follow. We hope that this essay will 
spur more discussion and research into the dynamic nature of the ITC 
market place and its regulation. 
   Lessons 
What are the lessons to be learned? Firstly, in the current debate over 
convergence, policy makers point to telephony and cable companies moving 
into each other's markets20. Telephone companies are announcing video 
services to their customers and cable firms are providing voice telephone 
services. In the video sector, policy makers also point out that satellites 
provide video services. In voice services, wireless is also available. "Aha!" 
policy makers exclaim, competition has arrived. We can now leave these 
areas to market forces. All that needs to be done is to provide a "level-
playing field" (MARTIN, 2005)  21. A plethora of providers! No appeal to 
duopoly or oligopoly theory, the market is at work, nothing more needs to be 
done.; and certainly not any dynamic analysis. Obviously, recent history 
belies this conjecture. The lesson is that these are not perfectly competitive 
markets and, therefore, cannot be relied on to produce the results of perfect 
competition. Moreover, the world is not static; dynamic considerations must 
be accounted for. A more nuanced approach needs to be taken which 
accounts for market power, the substitution of alternatives (and who controls 
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21 This is not to discount the concept of a level playing field, but this does not solve all 
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them), how will the dynamics play out etc. and how will this impact 
investment decisions. A hands-off approach will not suffice to obtain the 
desired societal outcome. 
   Conclusion and further research 
The legislative and regulatory communities, as well as significant 
segments of the academic community, have relied on simple static or 
comparative static analysis to determine proper regulatory policy, particularly 
competition and pricing policy. Allegedly, these policies are to correct market 
failures, but the question is whether these policies are more detrimental than 
the market failures they are designed to remedy. The large public costs of 
regulation, as well as costs to the firms who must deal with the regulators 
and legislators, gaming of the regulatory process, etc. may well have 
swamped the distortions caused by market failures. Even more so if the 
models used by policy makers do not reflect market place realities, 
especially given that intermodal competition is emerging in the sector. 
A variety of dynamic models are now available offering better and more 
profound insights into the workings of the market. If policy makers are going 
to evoke the "market" then they need a better understanding of what this 
means. 
In this essay, we have focused on two regulatory problems related to the 
inappropriateness of the models used by policy makers. The first is to apply 
a simple, but easily understood, competitive model that is inappropriate to 
market conditions. The second focus in this essay is on the lack of dynamic 
considerations and how this impacts policy choices. This dynamic aspect of 
the market has been virtually totally ignored in the policy community. Both 
factors cause inappropriate policy conclusion with as yet unquantified costs 
to society. 
On a brighter note, Ofcom (2005) has begun to recognize some of the 
new techniques for examining policy issues with the dynamic tools that are 
available. We trust that this paper will spur more discussion and research 
into the dynamic nature of the ITC market place and can only hope that 
institutional structure will allow for such a departure from today's paradigm. J. ALLEMAN & P. RAPPOPORT  119 
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